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ABSTRACT
This article examines the taxation of road traffic in Germany and makes a proposal for 
its reform. The policy-oriented approach used here is inspired by the tradition of econo-
mists like Richard A. Musgrave in the United States or Günter Schmölders in Germany 
who always sought to integrate fiscal theory and fiscal practice. Thus, our considerations 
are guided by three basic principles of taxation which are well-founded theoretically 
and, at the same time, flexible enough to deal with issues of policy: fairness, efficiency 
and practicability. They are used, at first, to show what a systematic taxation of road traf-
fic would look like. Then, actual road traffic taxation in Germany is described and mea-
sured against this standard. It turns out that none of the different road traffic taxes or 
fees in Germany conform to the principles of taxation. Therefore, finally, a proposal for 
reform is made which is discussed not only in terms of fairness and efficiency but also in 
terms of political acceptability and of compatibility with European law. It is found that 
the reform proposed complies with the principles of taxation and European law, but 
that, at present, it may be difficult to win public acceptance for one of its parts
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HIGHLIGHTS
1. It is argued that road traffic taxation, like taxation in general, ought to follow cer-
tain basic principles, such as fairness, efficiency or practicability. According to these 
principles, taxes on road traffic can only be justified in the form of fees paid by road 
users and in the form of steering taxes in order to combat air pollution and congestion
2. Since road traffic taxation in Germany does not comply with the principles of taxa-
tion, a proposal for reform is put forward. As a first step, the motor vehicle tax is to 
be abolished and the energy tax is to be transformed into a tax on CO2 emissions; 
as a second step, the truck toll and the infrastructure charge are to be merged into a 
comprehensive toll
3. A European approach to the reform of road traffic taxation is needed, because any 
unilateral reform may possibly cause competitive disadvantages for German trans-
port companies and obstacles to the flow of traffic in Europe
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Статья посвящена изучению налогообложения дорожного движения в Германии 
и разработке предложений по его реформированию. В исследовании использо-
ван политико-ориентированный подход, соединяющий фискальную теорию и 
фискальную практику. Данный подход продолжает традиции таких исследова-
телей как Ричард Масгрейв (США) и Гюнтер Шмольдер (Германия). Поставлен 
вопрос о соответствие налогообложения дорожного движения в Германии трем 
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Introduction
In recent years, the internal combus-
tion engine in general and the diesel en-
gine in particular have more and more 
fallen into disrepute. The use of internal 
combustion engines in motor vehicles 
is being criticized for their release of the 
greenhouse gas CO2 and, thus, their con-
tribution to climate change. In addition, 
automakers have come under fire for the 
wide discrepancies between the “official” 
emission and fuel consumption figures 
determined on the dynamometer and the 
(much) higher figures under real driving 
conditions. The image of the diesel engine 
has suffered most — firstly, because of the 
diesel scandal due to the illegal use by the 
Volkswagen group of default devices with 
which emissions testing was manipulated 
and, secondly, because diesel cars and 
trucks are blamed for excessive concentra-
tions of nitrogen oxides in the air of city 
centers and threatened to be banned from 
major cities. These days, the diesel engine 
is no longer seen as a reliable, durable and 
economical engine but as a major source 
of pollution. This has already led to a de-
cline in the sale of new diesel cars and to 
losses in the market value of used diesel 
cars. Furthermore, the different tax rates 
for diesel and gasoline under the Energy 
Tax Code (formerly: Petroleum Tax Code) 
have been criticized. For example, the head 
of the Umweltbundesamt (Federal Agency 
for the Environment), Maria Krautzberger, 
called the lower tax rate for diesel an un-
warranted subsidy and demanded “the 
abolition of the diesel privilege granted by 
the Petroleum Tax Code” [1, my transla-
tion]. Similarly, Dudenhöffer suggests “to 
quickly adapt the taxation of diesel to the 
taxation of gasoline and, at the same time, 
основным принципам налогообложения: справедливости, эффективности и 
практичности. Первоначально рассматривается, каким образом может налогоо-
бложение дорожного движения воплощать данные принципы, а затем, анализи-
руется соответствие этим принципам налогов и сборов, составляющих систему 
налогообложения дорожного движения в Германии. Рассматриваются два на-
лога (энергетический налог и налог на автотранспорт) и два сбора (дорожный 
сбор для грузовых транспортных средств и плата за инфраструктуру). Сделан 
вывод, что ни один из представленных налогов и сборов не соответствует ос-
новным принципам налогообложения. На основе исследования предлагается 
реформирование налогов и сборов, связанных с дорожным движением в Герма-
нии. Анализируются перспективы предлагаемых изменений, их фискальные и 
экономические последствия. Предлагаемые изменения обсуждаются как с точки 
зрения их справедливости и эффективности, так и с точки зрения политической 
приемлемости и совместимости с европейским законодательством. Установлено, 
что предложенная реформа соответствует принципам налогообложения и евро-
пейского права, но труднореализуема в настоящее время
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА 
Налогообложение дорожного движения, принципы налогообложения, сбор с 
пользователя; дорожные пошлины; регулирующие налоги; налоги на выбросы; 
налоги на CO2
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. В соответствие с основными принципами налогообложения (справедливость, 
эффективность и практичность), участники дорожного движения должны 
уплачивать только регулирующие налоги и сборы для борьбы с загрязнением 
воздуха и дорожными пробками
2. Поскольку налогообложение дорожного движения в Германии не соответ-
ствует основным принципам налогообложения, предлагается, во-первых, отме-
нить налог на автотранспорт и преобразовать энергетический налог в налог на 
выбросы CO2; во-вторых, объединить дорожный сбор для грузовых транспорт-
ных средств и плату за инфраструктуру в единый сбор
3. Реформа налогообложения в области дорожного движения должна соответ-
ствовать общеевропейским подходам, поскольку любая односторонняя рефор-
ма может ухудшить конкурентные позиции немецких транспортных компаний 
и создать препятствия для дорожного движения в Европе
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to harmonize motor vehicle taxes on diesel 
cars and gasoline cars” [2, my translation].
In view of the above-mentioned prob-
lems such proposals seem to be justified 
and plausible. However, simply equaliz-
ing the tax rates for diesel and gasoline by, 
for example, raising the former to the level 
of the latter, would be inadequate as will 
be shown below. For us, the discussion 
about the diesel engine and the taxation of 
fossil fuels will serve only as the starting 
point for the examination of road traffic 
taxation in general. In the present paper, 
a systemic view of tax reform shall be ad-
opted — a view that is to be guided by 
certain basic principles of taxation. These 
principles shall be drawn upon, firstly, to 
criticize the present system of road traf-
fic taxation in Germany and, secondly, 
to derive proposals for the reform of this 
system — the objective being a system of 
road traffic taxation which is both consis-
tent and economically efficient.
But, first of all, we need to sketch the 
present system of road traffic taxation in 
Germany and point out its shortcomings.
The taxation of road traffic in Germany: 
The present situation
Presently, road traffic in Germany is 
subject to two particular taxes: the energy 
tax and the motor vehicle tax. Both are 
federal taxes, that is, their revenue is due 
to the federal government.
In 2006 the petroleum tax was merged 
into the new energy tax which applies not 
only to petroleum products like gasoline, 
diesel or fuel oil but also to coal, natural 
gas and biofuels. For road traffic, mainly 
the tax rates for gasoline and for diesel are 
relevant. Less important for road traffic are 
other fossil fuels like natural gas or liquified 
petroleum gas which shall be mentioned 
only in passing. The energy tax amounts 
to € 0.6545 per liter of gasoline (unleaded, 
low-sulfur) and € 0.4708 per liter of diesel 
(low-sulfur) (§ 2, par. 1, nos. 1, 4 Energy 
Tax Code). The higher tax rates for diesel 
and gasoline with a sulfur content of more 
than 10 mg/kg are all but irrelevant since 
the market share of these fuels is below 0.1 
%. The higher tax rate for leaded gasoline 
can be neglected too, since it is almost ex-
clusively used as an aviation fuel — and 
not for road traffic anymore [3]. Insofar as 
fuel is purchased by households (and not 
by business firms) the effective tax burden 
is increased by the value-added tax (VAT) 
which is imposed on the total net price and 
which, therefore, is imposed also on the 
energy tax which is part of the net price of 
fuel. With the VAT rate currently standing 
at 19 %, this increase amounts to € 0.1244 
or € 0.0894 per liter of gasoline or diesel, 
respectively. This assumes, as is usual, that 
the energy tax is completely shifted for-
ward to the buyers of fossil fuels. (The en-
ergy tax on natural gas is € 13.90 per MWh 
of thermal value (§ 2, par. 2, no. 7a Energy 
Tax Code).) The thermal value of natural 
gas being 12.87 kW per kilogram, this is 
equivalent to an energy tax of € 0.1789 per 
kilogram of natural gas (natural gas is sold 
by mass, not by volume); the VAT apply-
ing to this tax amounts to € 0.0340 per ki-
logram.)
Whether the fact that diesel is taxed 
at a lower rate than gasoline is called a 
subsidy of diesel or the different taxation 
of different tax bases is only a matter of 
semantics which might be used as a politi-
cal argument, but which is irrelevant for 
economic analysis.
Energy tax revenue in 2016 amounted 
to € 40.091 billion — of which the tax on 
unleaded, low-sulfur gasoline and on low-
sulfur diesel contributed € 15.868 billion 
and € 20.849 billion, respectively. (In com-
parison, the taxation of natural tax used 
for motor vehicles yielded only € 0.004 bil-
lion [3].)
The motor vehicle tax, which is levied 
on an annual basis, uses different tax bases 
for the different kinds of motor vehicles. 
Here, we shall be concerned only with 
cars and heavy trucks (with a permissible 
total weight of more than 3,500 kg). For 
cars with gasoline engines, newly regis-
tered since January 1st, 2014, the tax rate 
is € 2.00 for every 100 cm3 of engine ca-
pacity plus € 2.00 for every gram of the 
CO2 emission per kilometer in excess of 
95 g/km. CO2 emissions are determined 
by a dynamometer test which is standard-
ized within the EU. (Cars which run on 
natural gas are taxed like those which run 
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on gasoline.) In the case of diesel cars the 
tax component based on engine capacity 
rises to € 9.50 for every 100 cm3, but the 
tax component based on CO2 emissions 
stays the same (§ 9, par. 1, no. 2b Motor 
Vehicle Tax Code). Trucks are taxed in 
accordance with permissible total weight 
and the amount of emissions and noise 
they produce. For the computation of 
the tax the so-called “graduated tax-rate 
method” is used; in addition, there is an 
upper limit to the total tax due (§ 9, par. 1, 
no. 4 Motor Vehicle Tax Code). For ex-
ample, the maximal tax for trucks belong-
ing to emissions class S2 (S1) is € 556.00 
(€ 914.00) — amounts which are of the 
same order of magnitude as those for cars 
with big diesel engines (for example, the 
motor vehicle tax for a Range Rover 4.4 
SDV8 is € 666.00). Motor vehicle tax rev-
enue in 2016 was € 8.952 billion; there is 
no current data on the respective shares of 
cars, trucks and other vehicle categories 
but, if data from the recent past is any in-
dication, cars will have contributed more 
than 80% of total revenue [4; 5].
As can be seen from Table 1 [3; 4] 
there have been only insignificant changes 
in both energy tax and vehicle tax revenue 
during the last ten years; furthermore, the 
energy tax on unleaded, low-sulfur gaso-
line and low-sulfur diesel has always been 
the most important part of the energy tax 
(accounting for more than 80% of total en-
ergy tax revenue in each year).
Table 1
Energy Tax Revenue in Germany 
2007–2016
Year Energy Tax Revenue 
in billions of Euros
Vehicle 
Tax 
Revenue 
in billions 
of Euros
total unleaded, low-
sulfur gasoline and 
low-sulfur diesel
2016 40.091 36.717 8.952
2015 42.433 36.465 8.805
2014 41.893 30.095 8.501
2013 42.160 35.410 8.490
2012 42.115 35.457 8.443
2011 41.985 36.068 8.422
2010 43.025 35.719 8.488
2009 41.238 34.759 8.201
2008 41.418 35.137 8.842
2007 41.712 35.080 8.898
Comparing the total tax burden of 
cars, it is obvious that cars with gasoline 
engines are hit harder by the energy tax 
than cars with diesel engines, whereas 
the motor vehicle tax is lower for the for-
mer than for the latter. Since the motor 
vehicle tax is a fixed cost and the energy 
tax is a variable cost (with only the latter 
depending on mileage), the total tax bur-
den per kilometer (or mile) for diesel and 
for gasoline cars compares as follows: For 
low mileages the total tax per kilometer is 
lower for gasoline than for diesel cars — 
and vice versa for high mileages. At what 
mileage exactly a car with a diesel engine 
becomes cheaper in terms of taxes than 
a car with a gasoline engine depends on 
the car model considered, of course. This 
difference in taxation is due to the policy 
of avoiding high tax burdens for vehicles 
used by businesses (such as taxi and trans-
port companies) which almost exclusively 
are equipped with diesel engines and 
whose annual mileage is, in most cases, 
very high. This policy is aimed at long-
haul transport companies, in particular, 
which are subject to international compe-
tition and which would suffer from com-
petitive disadvantages, if the energy tax on 
diesel were higher (at present, it is at about 
the European average). It is for that reason 
also that the motor vehicle tax on trucks is 
very low in comparison to that on cars.
In addition to these two taxes, there 
are also two traffic-related user fees: the 
truck toll and the infrastructure charge. 
Heavy trucks (with a permissible total 
weight of at least 7,500 kg) are subject to 
a toll which is collected on highways and 
major federal roads. The toll rate depends 
on the number of axles of a truck and its 
trailer and on the emission class; at pres-
ent, it varies between € 0.125 and € 0.214 
per kilometer. The infrastructure charge 
applies only to cars. It is a lump-sum 
charge that depends on engine capacity 
and emission class but not on mileage. 
German car owners have to pay it annu-
ally while foreigners using German roads 
are charged pro rata temporis. The infra-
structure charge has already been enacted 
but is not levied yet because several suits 
against it brought by other EU members 
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are still pending in the European Court 
of Law. The plaintiffs accuse Germany of 
discriminating against foreign drivers be-
cause German drivers will be compensat-
ed for the infrastructure charge by a rebate 
on the motor vehicle tax so that in effect 
only foreign drivers will be burdened [6]. 
The revenue of both the truck toll and 
the infrastructure charge is due to the fed-
eral government. The latter has not yet 
generated any revenue; the development 
of the revenue of the former is shown in 
table 2 [source of data: personal communi-
cation from the Federal Ministry of Trans-
port and Digital Infrastructure].
Table 2
Truck Toll Revenue in Germany 
2007–2016
Year Truck Toll Revenue in billions 
of Euros
2016 4.634
2015 4.372
2014 4.457
2013 4.389
2012 4.364
2011 4.475
2010 4.511
2009 4.327
2008 3.490
2007 3.308
Henceforth, the term “tax” shall be in-
terpreted broadly — so as to include not 
only taxes in the narrow sense but also 
fees and charges.
The principles of taxation
In order for a tax system to be truly 
systematic — and not just a haphazard col-
lection of various, unrelated and uncoordi-
nated, taxes — it has to be governed by cer-
tain basic principles. At least since the time 
of Adam Smith, economists and political 
philosophers have put forward catalogues 
of principles that “good” tax systems are 
required to follow. It is neither possible nor 
necessary to discuss these catalogues in 
any detail here. Instead, only those very ba-
sic principles which seem to enjoy (almost) 
unanimous approval shall be considered 
[for the principles of taxation see, e.g., 7, 
p. 408; 8, pp. 224–225; 9, pp. 197–206].
Firstly, the tax burden ought to be dis-
tributed equitably among taxpayers — or, 
rather, since there is no objective standard 
of equity, the distribution of the tax bur-
den ought to be perceived and accepted as 
equitable. Fairness can be realized by ei-
ther the ability-to-pay or the benefit prin-
ciple — with the former being today the 
predominant principle of taxation and the 
latter only playing a subsidiary role. Sec-
ondly, insofar as taxes are used to achieve 
objectives of economic policy, they ought 
to be compatible with these objectives, that 
is, they must be so designed as to realize 
the objectives effectively and efficiently. 
And, thirdly, administration and compli-
ance costs ought to be as low as possible, 
to wit, as low as is compatible with other, 
higher-ranking objectives.
These three principles may also be 
characterized as follows: The first one is 
concerned with distribution or fairness; 
the second one with allocation or efficien-
cy; and the third one with practicability.
Obviously, a policy-oriented approach 
is being followed here. Instead of aiming 
for the elusive objective of a social opti-
mum, time-honored and commonsensical 
principles of taxation are appealed to. Thus, 
it will be possible to accommodate flexibly 
the different aspects of tax policy — from 
efficiency and distribution to feasibility 
and acceptability. In this way, possible con-
flicts, and the trade-offs that then are nec-
essary, can be made explicit. This may not 
be the most rigorous approach but, then 
again, it is not the most inapplicable either. 
Let us now see what implications our prin-
ciples have for the taxation of road traffic.
Fairne]ss:  
ability-to-pay vs. benefit principle
Like all taxes, taxes on road traffic may 
have two purposes: to raise revenue or to 
influence the behavior of tax payers. Insofar 
as the former is the only (or main) purpose, 
fairness is the most important criterion to be 
fulfilled. Obviously, in the context of taxes 
on road traffic, the ability-to-pay principle 
is inapplicable. Income being the generally 
accepted measure of ability to pay at pres-
ent, it is not compatible with the ability-to-
pay principle to tax both income and con-
sumption. To do so would result in double 
taxation, that is, the taxation of both the 
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potential satisfaction of wants (income) and 
the actual satisfaction of wants (consump-
tion). Thus, taxes on consumption cannot 
be justified by invoking the ability-to-pay 
principle, if income is used as a measure 
of ability to pay. This also goes for taxes on 
road traffic which, by definition, are taxes 
on consumption in one way or another.
On the other hand, these taxes may be 
compatible with the benefit principle, in-
sofar as they can be regarded as “prices” 
to be paid for public services — in this 
case, for the provision and maintenance 
of the road infrastructure, the main users 
of which are motor vehicles. The benefit 
principle, as applied to the costs of pub-
lic services (and not to the utility derived 
from them) demands that the contribu-
tions paid be equivalent (or as nearly so as 
possible) to the costs of the public services 
enjoyed. However, earmarking certain 
revenues for certain expenditures is not 
required, although this would seem to be 
an implication of the benefit principle.
The quantity and quality of road infra-
structure that is needed depends primarily 
on the total mileage of all motor vehicles — 
which in turn is the product of the number 
of motor vehicles and their average mile-
age. The wear and tear of roads and thus 
the expenditure necessary for their main-
tenance also depends on total mileage and, 
besides, on the weight of motor vehicles. 
The differences in weight between various 
motor vehicles only matter, though, if they 
are very large — such as those between 
cars and heavy trucks: With cars weighing 
mostly between 1,000 and 2,500 kg, there 
is hardly any difference in road wear, if a 
light and a heavy car are compared with 
each other; but road wear will be found to 
increase disproportionately, if one consid-
er cars, on the one hand, and heavy trucks, 
on the other.
If road infrastructure were to be fi-
nanced in strict accordance with the ben-
efit principle, a toll which takes mileage 
and, in addition, vehicle weight into ac-
count would be the only possible alterna-
tive. Ideally, such a toll would be collected 
for the use of all kinds of roads — with 
the toll per kilometer depending on the 
weight (or, rather, the weight class) of the 
respective vehicle. Due to recent techno-
logical advances (such as GPS navigation, 
electronic metering technology, mobile 
internet connections), such an ideal toll 
could be realized today without prohibi-
tive costs: Tolls would be deducted elec-
tronically by way of in-vehicle transpon-
ders. The main obstacle seems to be a 
political one: How can the privacy of driv-
ers be protected and how can undue sur-
veillance by the state be prevented?
Efficiency: steering taxes
Road traffic taxation may not only (or 
not primarily) aim at raising revenue — 
instead, its main objective may be to influ-
ence the behavior of taxpayers in accor-
dance with economic policy objectives.
As (motorized) road traffic is the 
source of many negative externalities, it 
stands to reason that traffic-related steer-
ing taxes ought to be geared towards the 
internalization or reduction of these nega-
tive external effects. According to our pol-
icy-oriented approach, we do not advocate 
for the complete internalization of external 
effects. Instead, they are to be reduced in 
accordance with politically determined 
objectives (which may, or may not, be “op-
timal” from a welfare-theoretic point of 
view). In other words, our traffic-related 
steering taxes are not supposed to be “op-
timal” Pigou taxes but, less ambitiously, 
merely cost-efficient taxes in the tradition 
of the “standards and price” approach as 
pioneered by Baumol and Oates [10].
There are two major classes of exter-
nalities due to road traffic: the effects of 
congestion (in particular, the time lost 
in traffic jams) and the effects of air pol-
lution. Besides, other kinds of external 
effects may exist, but they are either of 
minor importance or do not seem to lend 
themselves to the use of taxes [for a dis-
cussion of the externalities related to road 
traffic see, e.g., 11 and 12].
Let us first turn to congestion. On 
heavily travelled or even congested roads 
drivers impose externalities on one another 
because every driver contributes to conges-
tion by slowing down the speed of all oth-
ers; thus he increases the travel time for all 
others. Efficiency requires that motorists 
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take these effects into account, which can 
be accomplished by levying a congestion 
charge. This charge ought to vary accord-
ing to traffic intensity which itself depends 
on road location and travel time. For ex-
ample, for rural roads there would be no 
congestion charge at all. On the other hand, 
in urban areas a congestion charge would 
be collected which would be highest dur-
ing rush hour and lowest (possibly zero) in 
the middle of the night. Ideally, one might 
in addition differentiate the charge accord-
ing to vehicle length (the longer a vehicle is, 
the more of the road it uses and the more 
it contributes to congestion), so that trucks 
would have to pay a higher charge than 
cars. Though such congestion charges have 
been introduced in some few cities — e.g., 
London and Stockholm —, a nationwide 
congestion charge does not yet exist any-
where. In practice, such a system might 
be combined with a general road toll (see 
above); the congestion charge might be 
added to the toll as a surcharge to be paid 
only on certain roads and at certain times. 
Such an extended road toll would then 
consist of two components: a fee-like com-
ponent that is to finance road infrastructure 
(at least partly), and a tax-like component 
that is to discourage drivers from congest-
ing roads. As mentioned above, such a 
scheme would be technically feasible now-
adays, but privacy concerns would make 
its introduction politically difficult.
The second major class of traffic-relat-
ed externalities is caused by air pollution. 
Motorized road traffic is one of the major 
sources of air pollution and thus respon-
sible for many environmental problems 
and, in particular, serious risks for human 
health. Alternatively, one might consider 
another ecological objective — that of sav-
ing natural resources. But, at present, the 
main problem with the use of fossil fuels 
does not seem to be their exhaustibility but 
the environmental degradation resulting 
from the emission of pollutants. Road traf-
fic is responsible for the emission of enor-
mous quantities of air pollutants and thus 
for excess costs due to the negative external 
effects caused by these pollutants (in what 
follows we shall neglect the non-material 
emission of noise). To reduce these negative 
externalities to an acceptable level (which 
has to be determined politically), taxes or, 
to be more specific, emission taxes can be 
used. In fact, it is a well-established result 
of environmental economics that emission 
taxes have many advantages in compari-
son with the more traditional command 
and control approach. Both an ecologically 
effective and an economically efficient re-
duction of emissions can be achieved, if the 
quantities of pollutants released serve as 
tax bases so that the tax due results from 
the product of the tax rate (in monetary 
units per unit of emission) and the quantity 
of emissions. Conversely, if the emission of 
pollutants is to be reduced and if taxes are 
to be used for this purpose, they must be 
used in the form of (direct or indirect) emis-
sion taxes; taxes with bases other than the 
quantity of emission will hardly be able to 
be of much use [for emission taxes and the 
way they work, see, e.g., 10; 13, pp. 190–
210; 14, ch. 6; 15, part III].
Whether emission taxes are to be used 
depends a lot on the emissions we have 
to deal with. Therefore, let us have a look 
at the emissions of motorized vehicles. 
Pollutants in the narrow sense (i.e. pol-
lutants which are directly inimical to hu-
man health) make up about 0.2 % (diesel 
engines) or 1.1 % (gasoline engines) of the 
total emissions of internal combustion en-
gines [16; 17]. These “traditional” pollut-
ants are nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, 
hydrocarbons, particulate matter and sul-
fur oxides. Except for sulfur oxides, these 
pollutants can be treated with devices such 
as three-way catalytic converters, oxida-
tion catalytic converters, particulate filters, 
nitrogen oxide storage converters and SCR 
catalytic converters. Sulfur oxides cannot 
be treated with end-of-pipe technologies; 
their emission can only be reduced by re-
ducing the sulfur content of fossil fuels. 
Beside the traditional pollutants, internal 
combustion engines emit nitrogen, oxygen, 
water vapour and carbon dioxide. The lat-
ter is a colourless, odourless, non-toxic and 
chemically very stable gas — and thus no 
pollutant in the narrow sense. However, 
CO2 is a greenhouse gas and — as such — 
a climate pollutant: It may, due to its effects 
on the climate, cause externalities indirect-
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ly. In fact, the current level of CO2 releases 
into the atmosphere from the burning of 
fossil fuels is clearly incompatible with the 
stability of the climate and with sustain-
ability. Therefore, without discussing cli-
mate policy in any detail, we may state that 
the emissions of CO2 need to be curtailed 
significantly, if potentially catastrophic de-
velopments are to be prevented. For our 
analysis, the following difference between 
traditional pollutants and the climate pol-
lutant CO2 is most important: There is no 
direct relation between the emission of tra-
ditional pollutants and fuel consumption. 
A powerful engine with a sophisticated 
exhaust gas treatment may consume much 
more fuel and, at the same time, emit much 
fewer pollutants than a low-powered en-
gine without any exhaust treatment. On 
the other hand, there does exist such a di-
rect relation in the case of CO2: The com-
bustion of a certain quantity of a fossil fuel 
always leads to the emission of a certain 
quantity of CO2, which depends on the 
carbon content of the different fossil fuels; 
fuel consumption and CO2 emission are, 
for every type of fossil fuel, directly pro-
portional to each other. Admittedly, there 
are minute divergences: An engine with a 
catalytic converter emits, e.g., less carbon 
monoxide and fewer hydrocarbons than an 
engine without a catalytic converter; and 
since these pollutants are oxidized to CO2 
and H2O in the catalytic converter, the CO2 
emission of the clean engine will be some-
what higher. But these divergences are so 
very small that they can safely be neglected 
for all practical purposes.
It is because of this proportional-
ity that emissions can only in the case of 
CO2 be taxed indirectly. This means that 
emissions need not to be taxed themselves 
but that instead fuel consumption can be 
taxed. All other pollutants would have to 
be taxed directly, which would require 
measuring the quantities of the various 
pollutants emitted by every single motor 
vehicle. (What is more, the tax rates for the 
different pollutants would also have to de-
pend on where they are emitted, because 
car exhaust is less dangerous and causes 
less damage on some little travelled coun-
try road than on an urban thoroughfare. 
In the case of CO2, on the other hand, the 
quantity of emissions is all that matters; the 
location of emissions is completely irrel-
evant.) Although technically feasible, this 
would be extremely costly. In addition, 
collecting these taxes would also be very 
expensive because measurement results 
would have to be transmitted regularly 
to tax authorities, which would then have 
to calculate tax bills and send them to the 
owners of motor vehicles. Therefore, con-
siderations of cost and (im-) practicability 
require that traditional pollutants be dealt 
with by imposing regulations, that is, by 
using the command and control approach. 
(The same also goes for the emission of 
noise) On the other hand, the instrument 
of an emission tax can be applied to CO2 
emissions because, in the form of an indi-
rect tax, it causes only negligible adminis-
trative and compliance costs.
Figure shows the results of the discus-
sion in the previous two sections.
Social costs of traffic
Road construction and maintenanceExternalities
Congestion Emissions Toll (depending on mileage
and vehicle weight)
CO2 Traditional pollutants (and noise)
Congestion 
charge
(depending on
traffic density)
CO2 emission tax Command and control
Social costs of traffic and how to deal with them
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Steering taxes (or tax-like charges) 
have an important role to play when it 
comes to dealing with congestion and CO2 
emissions; they are less suited for reducing 
the emission of traditional pollutants (and 
noise). As regards fiscal taxes, the benefit 
principle may be invoked to justify the use 
of tolls for financing road infrastructure.
Road traffic taxation in Germany  
and the principles of taxation
As shown above, a system of taxes on 
road traffic can be derived from the prin-
ciples of taxation. How do the actual taxes 
on road traffic in Germany compare to this 
system? It is obvious that it is quite differ-
ent from our “ideal” system. How big the 
difference is and whether it complies at 
least in some degree with the principles of 
taxation shall be examined next.
The benefit principle
Since the ability-to-pay principle in in-
applicable in the case of road taxation (see 
above), it is only the benefit principle that 
may be used to justify German road traffic 
taxes. Let us first have a look at the mo-
tor vehicle tax. It very quickly will become 
apparent that in this case the necessary 
equivalence between the cost of the public 
service and the amount to be contributed 
by its users does not even approximately 
exist: The amount of motor vehicle tax to 
be paid is completely independent of both 
mileage and weight in the case of cars. 
And, though taking weight into account, 
the motor vehicle tax on trucks disregards 
the much more important mileage: For 
example, even though a 10 ton truck with 
an annual mileage of 100,000 kilometers 
causes significantly more damage to roads 
than a 30 ton truck with an annual mile-
age of only 10,000 kilometers, the motor 
vehicle tax on the latter is higher than that 
on the former. Furthermore, the relation 
between the motor vehicle tax on cars and 
that on trucks is incompatible with the 
benefit principle: Since, because of their 
much higher weight and their much high-
er mileage, trucks wear out roads much 
more than cars, they ought to be taxed 
higher by orders of magnitude — which is 
certainly not the case at present.
The energy tax better complies with 
the benefit principle because a higher 
fuel consumption is, ceteris paribus, tan-
tamount to a higher mileage and, thus, to 
more road wear. But even here, the rela-
tionship is rather weak. Driving style is 
a very important factor: An economical 
driver may, for example, be able to drive a 
distance of 1,500 kilometers with 100 liters 
of gas whereas a sports driver may only 
do 1,000 kilometers with the same car and 
the same quantity of fuel. The economi-
cal driver uses roads more than the sports 
driver but has to pay the same amount of 
energy tax (since, in our example, the fuel 
consumption is supposed to be the same). 
Even more important are differences be-
tween the various car models: A sport scar 
with a powerful engine that consumes 
15 liters of gas per 100 kilometers does 
not cause three times as much road wear 
as a subcompact with a small engine that 
consumes only 5 liters of gas per 100 ki-
lometers. The same arguments also apply 
to trucks — although in their case the dif-
ferences with regard to engine power are 
less marked. Therefore, also the energy tax 
cannot be justified by invoking the benefit 
principle. This conclusion is, by the way, 
not affected by the earmarking of part of 
the energy tax revenue (formerly: petro-
leum tax revenue) for road construction — 
which, besides, has been attenuated and 
de facto abandoned since the 1970s [18].
As we have seen, a road toll is the fis-
cal instrument which complies best with 
the benefit principle. In Germany, there is 
a toll for heavy trucks and, for cars, there 
is to be the “infrastructure charge” (see 
above). Both can by no means meet the 
demands of the benefit principle. The for-
mer is collected not on all roads but only 
on highways and certain federal roads. 
Furthermore, vehicle weight is taken into 
account only indirectly (by the toll rate be-
ing dependent on the number of axles). 
In addition, the toll rate also depends on 
the emission class — which, however, 
does not affect road wear at all. The infra-
structure charge fares even worse, as it is 
completely independent of mileage. How-
ever, it might serve as a first step towards 
a “real” toll [6].
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Steering taxes and the allocative 
function of road traffic taxation
As the present taxes on road traffic in 
Germany cannot be justified by the ben-
efit principle, we have to examine wheth-
er they perhaps serve as steering taxes so 
that they might find their justification in 
this way.
Let us first turn to the problem of air 
pollution. It is true that, for quite some 
time, environmental aspects have played 
an important role in road traffic taxation 
in Germany. Since the reform of the mo-
tor vehicle tax in 1985 the emission of pol-
lutants has been one of the factors which 
determine the tax rate for cars: From 1985 
to 2009 only traditional pollutants were 
taken into account; since then the focus 
has been on CO2 emissions instead. As 
regards the motor vehicle tax on trucks, 
since 1994 the emission of traditional pol-
lutants has been among the determinants 
of the tax rate. And since the ecological tax 
reform of 1999, at the latest, also the petro-
leum tax (now the energy tax) has explic-
itly been used to further the cause of the 
environment: Then, it was raised consid-
erably in order to make the use of fossil 
fuels more expensive and thus to provide 
incentives for saving them. In addition, 
tax rates were differentiated according 
to the environmental impact of different 
fuels (leaded vs. unleaded gasoline; high-
sulfur vs. low-sulfur).
But, notwithstanding all political in-
tentions, are the energy tax and the motor 
vehicle tax actually able to function as eco-
logical steering taxes? As we have seen, in 
the case of road traffic, the obvious ecolog-
ical objective is the reduction of emissions. 
If taxes are to be used at all to such pur-
pose, they need to be emission taxes. And 
emission taxes as applied to the emissions 
of motor vehicles only make sense in the 
form of indirect emission taxes. Finally, 
an indirect emission tax is possible only 
in the case of CO2. It follows that the en-
ergy tax and the motor vehicle tax can be 
justified as ecological steering taxes only if 
they somehow function as CO2 emission 
taxes, that is, if there is a direct and pro-
portional relation between CO2 emission 
and tax burden.
Obviously, this is — and cannot be — 
the case with a mileage-independent tax 
like the motor vehicle tax. It is true that, 
as regards cars, the tax base includes CO2 
emissions: explicitly in the form of the 
CO2-based part of the tax and implicitly 
in the part of the tax which is based on 
engine capacity (since fuel consump-
tion and thus CO2 emissions tend to in-
crease with engine capacity). However, 
it is not the relative CO2 emission (i.e. 
the emission per kilometer) but the ab-
solute CO2 emission, which depends on 
mileage, that matters ecologically. The 
motor vehicle tax only takes the former 
into account — and even that in a very 
imprecise way because the “normal” CO2 
emissions per kilometer which are used 
for tax purposes may differ a lot from the 
real CO2 emissions per kilometer on the 
road. In the case of trucks, CO2 emissions 
do not play any role at all. It follows that 
the motor vehicle tax cannot be regarded 
as a tax on CO2 emissions and is thus not 
an effective instrument to reduce these 
emissions. This conclusion will not be al-
tered by the possible argument that, after 
all, the motor vehicle tax can be consid-
ered as an ecological steering tax because 
it discourages the acquisition of cars with 
large engine capacities and high CO2 
emissions, and of trucks with “dirty” en-
gines. However, these objectives do not 
make sense on their own but only insofar 
as they further the underlying objective 
of reducing emissions. And to attain this 
objective, there are instruments much 
more effective and much more efficient 
than the motor vehicle tax.
At first sight, things look different 
with the energy tax. As it taxes the con-
sumption of fossil fuels it is, in principle, 
able to function as an indirect CO2 tax. 
However, for this to be the case, it would 
be necessary that the tax rates for the dif-
ferent fuels vary in proportion with their 
carbon content, that is, with the amount 
of CO2 released by their combustion. This 
condition is, at present, not fulfilled. Burn-
ing one liter of gasoline (diesel) releases 
2.33 kg (2.63 kg) of CO2 [19; 20]. Therefore, 
the energy tax on gasoline of € 0.6545 per 
liter corresponds to a CO2 tax of € 0.2809 
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per kilogram, whereas the energy tax on 
diesel of € 0.4704 per liter is equivalent to 
a CO2 tax of € 0.1783 per kilogram. (The 
energy tax on natural gas of € 13.90 per 
MWh of thermal value is equivalent to a 
CO2 tax of € 0.0706 per kilogram, because 
burning one MWh of natural gas releases 
197 kg of CO2.) Its tax rates being not pro-
portional to carbon content, the energy tax 
cannot be regarded as an indirect tax on 
CO2 emissions.
We have to conclude that neither the 
motor vehicle tax nor the energy tax can 
be justified as an ecological steering tax.
Besides air pollution, the other ma-
jor cause of traffic-related externalities is 
congestion. Are the truck toll or the infra-
structure charge in any way able alleviate 
this problem and thus to have some kind 
of allocative function? The answer clear-
ly is no. From all that we have learned 
about the truck toll and the infrastructure 
charge, it should be obvious that neither 
can in any way function as a congestion 
charge.
To summarize, the German “system” 
of road traffic taxation does not in the least 
correspond to the principles of taxation 
and is therefore in dire need of reform.
A proposal for reform
What would a reform of German road 
traffic taxation look like? As shown above, 
road traffic ought best to be taxed as fol-
lows: There ought to be a CO2 emission 
tax which is to function as a steering tax; 
and there ought to be a comprehensive 
toll which is both to raise revenue accord-
ing to the benefit principle and to alleviate 
traffic congestion in its capacity as a steer-
ing tax. To get anywhere close to such a 
system, traffic taxation in Germany needs 
to be reformed considerably.
Part one of the reform: energy tax and 
motor vehicle tax
The first part of the reform would 
have to look as follows: On the one hand, 
the motor vehicle tax is to be abolished; 
under no circumstances can it be an in-
strument to reduce CO2 emissions ef-
fectively and efficiently. On the other 
hand, the rates of the energy tax have to 
be adapted to the specific CO2 emissions 
of the different fossil fuels. If the ecologi-
cal objective were not to be climate sta-
bilization but resource conservation, the 
energy tax rates would have to reflect the 
energy content or the thermal value of 
the different fossil fuels (such a proposal 
is made by, e.g., [21]).
If one takes as given, e.g. the energy 
tax rate for gasoline of € 0.6545 per li-
ter, which is equivalent to a CO2 tax of 
€ 0.2809 per kilogram, the energy tax on 
diesel would have to be raised to € 0.7388 
per liter. It goes without saying that the 
tax rates for the other fossil fuels which 
are used for road traffic would also have 
to be adapted correspondingly (in the case 
of natural gas this would imply a tax raise 
to € 55.34 per MWh or € 0.7122 per kilo-
gram). In this way, the energy tax would 
burden all road-traffic related CO2 emis-
sions uniformly and thus function as an 
efficient and, depending on the CO2 tax 
rate, effective CO2 tax. Finally, it would be 
justifiable as a steering tax, to wit, an eco-
logical steering tax.
But what other consequences would 
our proposal have? From a fiscal point of 
view, the additional revenue due to the 
higher taxation of diesel would certainly 
be welcome (due to their very low market 
shares, possible tax hikes for other fossil 
fuels would only lead to insignificant ad-
ditional revenue). Of course, the fiscal ef-
fect can be varied by adjusting the CO2 tax 
rate. It is not the absolute rate as such that 
is crucial for the energy tax to function as 
a CO2 tax but the fact that there is a uni-
form rate for all fossil fuels. Assuming, as 
is usual, that the energy tax is completely 
shifted forward, the price of diesel would 
rise by € 0.2684 per liter before VAT and 
by € 0.3194 per liter after VAT. On the ba-
sis of the 2016 sales figure (44.321 billion of 
liters) energy tax revenue would increase 
by € 11.896 billion (this amount and those 
following were calculated on the basis of 
[3] and [4]). If the business share (house-
hold share) of diesel consumption is taken 
to be 75% (25%), there would also be addi-
tional VAT revenue (the VAT applying to 
the increase of the net price of diesel times 
the household share in total diesel sales) 
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of € 0.565 billion. The percentages of 25 % 
and 75 % are derived as follows: Trans-
port companies with their trucks account 
for about 50 % of total diesel consumption 
[22, p. 53] so that the other 50% are due to 
cars. Assuming that half of the latter 50% 
is used by businesses will result in the 
above-mentioned percentages. With total 
additional tax revenue of € 12.461 billion, 
the loss of the motor vehicle tax revenue, 
which in 2016 amounted to € 8.952 billion, 
would be more than compensated; all in 
all, there would be net additional revenue 
of € 3.509 billion.
However, it is to be expected that the 
considerable increase in the price of diesel, 
which would result from the suggested 
tax hike, would have consequences for the 
demand for diesel. In general, the price 
elasticity of demand for fuels in Germany 
is thought to be rather low — at least in the 
short run. For example, Boysen-Hogrefe 
[23] assumes values of –0.2 and –0.5 as the 
lower and the upper limit, respectively, to 
this price elasticity. If we choose the in-
termediate value of –0.35 for the demand 
for diesel, the fiscal effects of our proposal 
would change as follows: Because of the 
tax hike, the price of diesel, which stood, 
at the time of writing, at about € 1.26 per 
liter (VAT included), would rise by 25.3%, 
so that demand for diesel would decrease 
by 8.9 %, that is, from 44.321 billion liters 
to 40.377 billion liters (the relative price in-
crease applies both to the price before and 
after VAT; therefore, the relative decrease 
in demand is assumed to be the same for 
business and household demand). This 
fall in demand by 3.944 billion liters would 
reduce the additional revenue of € 11.896 
billion from the higher energy tax on die-
sel and of € 0.565 billion from the VAT to 
€ 8.982 billion and € 0.427 billion, respec-
tively, which would sum up to € 9.409 bil-
lion — still in excess of the revenue loss 
from the abolition of the motor vehicle tax 
by € 0.457 billion.
There would not be any distribution-
al conflicts within the federal fiscal sys-
tem of Germany: Both the energy tax and 
the motor vehicle tax are federal taxes so 
that neither states nor local governments 
would be affected — except through their 
share in the additional VAT revenue. In 
our example, the federal government, 
whose share in VAT revenue is current-
ly 53.3 %, would expect total additional 
revenue of € 0.231 billion (the difference 
between additional energy tax revenue 
and the loss of motor vehicle tax revenue: 
€ 0.003 billion; plus the federal share in 
the additional VAT revenue: € 0.228 bil-
lion); state and local governments togeth-
er would receive additional VAT revenue 
of € 0.199 billion.
In the longer run, the energy tax 
revenue can be expected to decline in as 
much as mileage would be reduced and 
fuel-saving vehicles or vehicles with alter-
native drives would be more and more in 
demand. But this effect would have been 
intended and would be evidence that the 
CO2 tax functions as it is supposed to.
While the revenue increase would 
thus not be lasting, there would be an-
other important effect which would be 
permanent: As the motor vehicle tax is, 
in contrast to the energy tax, levied di-
rectly from consumers, that is, the hold-
ers of motor vehicles, and as it thus is 
very costly to administer [24], its abolition 
would save a considerable amount of ad-
ministration costs. On the other hand, the 
proposed change in the energy tax would 
hardly involve any costs at all.
Besides, the proposed reform would 
lead to considerable distributional ef-
fects among the group of vehicle own-
ers. Owners of gasoline cars would profit 
from the abolition of the motor vehicle 
tax whereas owners of diesel cars and of 
trucks would have to pay the higher en-
ergy tax on diesel which, depending on 
mileage, could more than outweigh the 
savings related to the motor vehicle tax 
so that, for them, the reform could result 
in a net loss. As a rule, the mileage for 
such a net loss to occur would increase 
with the size and thus the fuel consump-
tion of the vehicle. Let us compare, for 
example, two diesel cars: a subcompact 
(Mercedes A160d: 107 g CO2/km; norm 
consumption 4.1 l/100 km; motor vehicle 
tax € 166.00) and a full-size sedan (Mer-
cedes S400d: 139 g CO2/km; norm con-
sumption 5.4 l/100km; motor vehicle tax 
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€ 373.00). The owner of the former would 
suffer a net loss due to the proposed re-
form if his annual mileage were in excess 
of 12,700 kilometers, whereas the latter 
would find himself at a disadvantage 
only if he drove more than 21,600 km 
per year. In this example, it was assumed 
that the cars were owned by households 
and that the price of diesel would rise 
by € 0.3194 per liter (after VAT). As the 
realistic on-the-road consumption is vir-
tually always higher than the norm con-
sumption, the mileages calculated are 
upper limits; in effect, drivers of diesel 
cars would incur losses at lower mile-
ages in most cases.
Business owners of diesel cars who 
typically have high to very high mile-
ages would therefore almost always be 
among the losers of the tax reform. This 
is even more true for transport compa-
nies: The trucks that they operate have a 
much higher mileage and a much higher 
consumption than diesel cars, whereas the 
motor vehicle tax — and thus the amount 
saved due to its abolition — is not higher 
in the same proportion.
It is this consequence of the first part 
of our proposal that will be the main ob-
stacle to its realization: German transport 
companies, especially long-haul transport 
companies, would become less competitive 
in comparison with foreign companies.
Part two of the reform:  
truck toll and infrastructure charge
According to our deliberations 
above, both the truck toll and the infra-
structure charge ought to be merged into 
a new and comprehensive toll. There 
ought to be a base rate per kilometer 
which would depend on vehicle weight. 
As almost all damage to roads is attribut-
able to (heavy) trucks, the rate for trucks 
would be higher than that for cars by or-
ders of magnitude. For all practical pur-
poses, four base rates (one for cars, one 
for light trucks, one for heavy trucks, 
and one for heavy trucks with trailers) 
would suffice. In addition to this user 
fee, there ought to be a surcharge for the 
use of heavily travelled roads in urban 
areas which would vary with the days 
of the week and the hour of the day. 
Again, one would want to have only a 
couple of different rates so that the tar-
iff does not become too complicated and 
thus the surcharge too unpredictable. 
This combined toll would be collected 
electronically by way of GPS-enabled 
transponders in all vehicles. Technically, 
this would be no problem at all; also, the 
cost would not be too high. However, 
there are considerable political obstacles. 
Privacy concerns, mistrust of “big gov-
ernment” and fear of data abuse would 
make the introduction of such a toll an 
uphill battle — which would be hard to 
win especially in Germany where data 
protection is considered very important.
Therefore, the chance for this part of 
our reform proposal to be realized soon 
are rather slim indeed. For political rea-
sons it would seem appropriate that at 
first only part one of the reform proposal 
be realized. Until safeguards will have 
been devised which ensure privacy and 
the protection of drivers’ data, and until 
sufficient political support for the second 
part will have been built, the present truck 
toll and the soon-to-come infrastructure 
charge would be left in place. In that way, 
truck owners would continue to contrib-
ute to the cost of road infrastructure and 
in that way, also car owners would at least 
get used to the idea of paying some kind 
of toll or user fee. (Other authors propose 
second-best solutions in which the vehicle 
tax partly compensates for the inability to 
impose a toll depending on mileage; see, 
e.g., [25; 26].)
The European perspective
Nowadays, member countries of the 
European Union are no longer completely 
free to carry out political reforms. They 
have to make sure that these reforms are 
compatible with European law.
In the Energy Taxation Directive 
(Annex I) of the European Commission, 
minimum rates for motor fuels are estab-
lished. There is, however, no further har-
monization and member states are free 
to apply higher rates. In fact, rates differ 
considerably within the European Union 
[27]. German rates are above the EU av-
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erage; its gasoline rate is the ninth high-
est and its diesel rate is the sixth highest. 
Therefore, as mentioned above, the uni-
lateral introduction of a CO2 tax — and 
the rise in the price of diesel consequent 
upon it — would cause problems for the 
German transport companies. If only for 
this reason, a European approach to the 
introduction of a CO2 tax would clearly 
be desirable — although it would not be 
necessary according to the law of the Eu-
ropean Union (there are also other rea-
sons for a coordinated reform; see Con-
clusion).
Also a comprehensive toll system — 
if and when it is finally installed — will 
have to comply with European law. As 
of today, the existing European legisla-
tion on tolls only covers trucks (permis-
sible total weight of more than 3,500 kg): 
the directive 1999/62/EC as modified by 
the directives 2006/38/EC and 2011/76/
EU. As regards cars, there is only a “Com-
munication from the Commission on the 
Application of National Road Infrastruc-
ture Charges Levied on Light Private Ve-
hicles” (COM 2012/199 of May 14th, 2012) 
in which member states are enjoined to 
obey the principles of non-discrimination 
and proportionality, if and when they es-
tablish toll schemes for cars (it is the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination that the Ger-
man infrastructure charge is accused of 
violating). Furthermore, in the directive 
2004/52/EC, the European Commission 
envisages a “European Electronic Toll 
System” which is to realize the principle 
of inter-operability. This means that a 
single on-board unit is to be used by driv-
ers throughout the EU to pay any national 
tolls. Thus, not only is there nothing in EU 
law that would prohibit a comprehensive 
toll system for both trucks and cars, some 
such system and the technical means for 
its implementation are actually promot-
ed by the European Commission. As, of 
course, also foreign road users would be 
supposed to pay this toll (just like drivers 
of foreign trucks have to pay the truck toll 
in Germany today), coordination between 
the EU member states would be highly 
desirable, although, again, it would not be 
required by law.
In any case, both parts of our reform 
proposal do not seem to conflict with Eu-
ropean law. After all, this was to be ex-
pected because the transport policy of the 
European Union is guided by the “user 
pays” and the “polluter pays” principle 
[28] — principles that correspond with 
and can be derived from the first and the 
second of our principles of taxation, re-
spectively.
Conclusion
It has been shown that the taxation of 
road traffic in Germany is not compatible 
with generally accepted principles of taxa-
tion and, therefore, ought to be reformed. 
Taxes on road traffic can be justified as 
fiscal taxes to raise revenue according to 
the benefit principle and as steering taxes 
to deal with environmental issues and 
congestion. Consequently, a reform has 
been proposed which would, on the one 
hand, replace the truck toll and the infra-
structure charge with a comprehensive 
toll and, on the other, abolish the motor 
vehicle tax and transform the energy tax 
into a tax on CO2 emissions. In order for 
German transport companies not to suffer 
competitive disadvantages from the uni-
lateral introduction of a CO2 tax and for 
traffic flow in Europe not to be impeded 
by uncoordinated national tolls, such a re-
form ought to be carried out on the Euro-
pean level.
In the context of such a European so-
lution one also could — and ought to — 
abandon the regulation of CO2 emissions 
of cars and light trucks (there are no CO2 
standards for heavy trucks) which not only 
would become superfluous if CO2 emis-
sions were taxed but which also would 
distort the economic incentives due to such 
a CO2 tax. In particular, it is possible that 
CO2 standards might actually increase to-
tal vehicle miles travelled [12, p. 388]. And 
of course one would wish to see a system-
atization of climate policy in general: Only 
when the burden on all CO2 emissions, no 
matter their source, is — at least approxi-
mately — equal, can a cost-efficient climate 
policy be realized. Towards this goal, the 
proposed reform of the energy tax would 
but be a first, albeit an important, step.
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